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ABSTRACT 
As the proliferation of digital computational systems continue to expand, 
increasingly complex technologies emerge, including those regarding large, 
enterprise-wide, information storage and retrieval systems. Within this study, we 
examine four contemporary enterprise storage technologies. Our examination of 
these technologies is presented with an overview of the technological features of 
each offering and then followed with a discussion of the impact of these 
technologies on digital forensics methods, particularly regarding forensic data 
acquisition. We offer a general opinion concerning a recommended data 
acquisition method when faced with the task of obtaining a forensic image of data 
contained within these technologies, we discuss limitations of our study, and 
lastly, we suggest areas in which additional research would benefit the field of 
digital forensics. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The evolution and adoption of contemporary enterprise data storage technologies 
provide challenges to traditional approaches for computer forensic data 
acquisition (Mohay, 2005).  Some of these technologies invalidate the once 
simple relationship between a single storage device or small group of storage 
devices and a volume of data presented to a computer or server. In the absence of 
this simpler relationship, it will be increasingly difficult to follow traditional 
forensic data acquisition procedures in obtaining a forensically sound image of 
the data (Carlton, 2007). This article explores some of these technologies and 
provides an overview of the challenges they may pose.  Alternative approaches 
for dealing with the challenges are also explored.   
2. OVERVIEW OF TRADITIONAL FORENSIC DISK IMAGE 
ACQUISITION METHODOLOGY 
The traditional digital forensic disk image acquisition processes provide the 
forensic examiner with physical access to the computer systems, including any 
disk storage media.  In these situations, forensic examiners have access to the 
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physical disk drives and are able to acquire static, or dead, forensic drive images 
from each of the physical disk drives.  In situations involving servers, the 
traditional dead acquisition utilizes a standard server shutdown procedure.  A 
hardware or software write blocker is used to prevent altering data on the 
evidence drive(s) and a bit-stream image of the evidence drive is made (Lessing 
& von Solms, 2008).  The traditional forensic data acquisition approach for 
servers utilizing an array of multiple physical disk drives into a logical volume, 
RAID configuration, provides the forensic examiner with two alternatives for 
static data acquisition. He or she may statically image each of the individual 
physical drives and then reassemble them into a logical disk volume using their 
forensic analysis tools, such as EnCase. In situations where the forensic examiner 
is not able to reassemble the individual disks into a logical volume, the forensic 
examiner may statically image the logical RAID volume from the server. 
An alternative to static data acquisition is a live disk image acquisition. While a 
static data acquisition is arguably preferred from scientific and legal perspectives, 
practical objections based on temporal and fiscal factors frequently restrict the 
static data acquisition of servers. Citing these objections as a justification for best 
evidence, a live acquisition alternative may be necessary when the target server 
cannot be taken down for forensic drive imaging. Additionally, a live acquisition 
is a viable alternative when the forensic examiner does not have physical access 
to the evidence storage media. Live acquisitions typically utilize the use of a 
software agent or acquisition tool on the target.  This may require the installation 
of the acquisition software on the host server after the fact, unless it was 
proactively installed.  This technique introduces an alteration to the data that 
would need to be documented, and accepted as best evidence. A forensic drive 
image obtained in this manner would be similar to the logical drive image 
described above as it is acquired from the host end and not directly from the disk 
drives themselves. Tools such as EnCase Enterprise Edition can be used to 
perform a live acquisition when static imaging is not possible (Guidance 
Software, 2011).  An additional challenge to this live acquisition method concerns 
the realization that data is dynamic during the live acquisition process; therefore, 
the ability of validating the acquisition process through duplication will not 
produce matching hash values. 
The static and live data acquisition methods have been recognized in the practice 
of digital forensics for over half of a decade. While both of these methods have 
their merits and limitations, these traditional forensic data acquisition methods 
were based on assumptions that suspect computer systems consisted of physical 
computational devices and physical storage media. In the following section, we 
discuss aspects of contemporary storage technologies that do not necessarily hold 
these assumptions.  
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3. DISCUSSION OF CONTEMPORARY ENTERPRISE STORAGE 
TECHNOLOGIES 
As advances in computational hardware, software, and information storage and 
retrieval technology continue to develop, numerous alternatives are emerging into 
the marketplace that challenge the traditional notion of physical computational 
devices and physical storage media. Within this section, we discuss four emerging 
storage technologies targeted at the enterprise storage market, namely: enterprise 
storage arrays and logical volumes, automatic storage tiering, data deduplication, 
and thin provisioning. While these technologies differ in their approach regarding 
information storage and retrieval, each provides specific challenges for digital 
forensic examiners. 
3.1 Enterprise storage arrays and logical volumes 
Enterprise storage arrays and logical volumes focus on storage technologies 
commonly found in enterprise storage area network (SAN) storage arrays.  The 
use of large enterprise storage arrays introduces multiple challenges to the 
traditional forensic disk image acquisition where direct access to the physical 
storage media is separated by an additional level of abstraction.  These logical 
storage arrays can consist of hundreds of physical disk storage devices that are 
used in the creation of logical units (LUN). LUNs are logical partitions of 
redundant array of independent disks (RAID) groups from the storage system 
(EMC Corporation, 2006). Hosts deriving storage from the storage system see a 
LUN as they would an individual disk drive.   The host is unaware of the exact 
physical makeup of the LUNs delivered by the storage array.  A LUN may consist 
of a single physical drive or many drives in RAID1, RAID5, RAID10, or other 
arrangement.  This additional level of abstraction raises the following challenges 
to the process of forensically acquiring data from a server utilizing enterprise 
storage arrays: 
1. Negative impact of downtime – The multi-user nature of servers 
frequently result in financial and legal objections to taking a server 
offline for the period of time necessary for forensic examiners to 
obtain a static image of the data. These objections are likely to be 
compounded in configurations utilizing enterprise storage arrays, 
as multiple servers may share the storage arrays. Given the multi-
user nature of servers and the impact on multiple servers, it may 
not be feasible to take the server down the time necessary to 
perform a traditional static drive acquisition due to the broader 
impact of the downtime. 
2. Additional complexity - The fact that the association between 
physical drives and the server is not as straightforward adds further 
complexity.   It would take collaboration with the storage system 
administrator to identify all involved storage devices as well as the 
specific RAID algorithm and parameters in order to access the 
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drives for forensic imaging and later reassemble the data into a 
usable form. In addition to the challenge presented by this 
additional technical complexity, additional legal complexity will 
likely surface in situations where physical storage devices are 
logically shared among different legal entities. 
3. Broader impact of shared storage - Even if the server can be taken 
out of service, the storage devices (disk drives) might not be 
dedicated to just the server in question.  This means that additional 
services would be impacted if drives were physically removed for 
forensic disk imaging. 
Despite the challenges identified above, it may still be feasible to perform a 
physical forensic drive acquisition in situations where a manageable number of 
drives are involved and where they can be physically accessed.  A logical 
acquisition of the LUN itself is also still possible. The remaining storage 
technologies that will be discussed will build on top of the concept of LUNS in 
presenting a logical disk or storage volume to server hosts, and present additional 
challenges which may prohibit the more direct forensic imaging of physical disk 
drives. 
3.2 Automatic storage tiering 
Storage and server administrators have been using a tiered approach for storage 
management for many years. Administrators would allocate storage to servers 
based on performance and capacity needs, and this could be done on a per-LUN 
basis as required. Tiering involves allocating LUNs from various groups of 
storage devices which are grouped by criteria, such as, differing performance 
levels and capacities.  For example, one might configure three tiers using these 
criteria: a capacity tier based on low-cost, high- capacity SATA drives, a 
performance tier based on faster, fiber channel drives, and even an ultra-high 
performance tier based on solid state drives. In this scenario, lower priority or 
bulk storage applications would be allocated LUNS from the lower tier, while 
higher priority applications would require storage from the high performance tier 
or ultra-high performance tier.  The manual allocation of LUNS from different 
tiers of storage does not necessarily introduce additional significant challenges to 
forensic imaging.  
However, unlike the manual allocation of LUNS described above, automated 
storage tiering introduces significant changes to the scenario.  Automated storage 
tiering allows a storage system to automatically identify “hot data” and move that 
data to higher performing data storage devices (Feresten, Freeman, & Woods, 
2011).  This simplifies storage data management by eliminating or reducing 
manual storage management, and it has the potential to reduce storage costs by 
using low-cost storage where permitted while intelligently moving high-use data 
to faster storage devices.   
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When automated storage tiering is utilized, there are two important differences to 
consider regarding data movement. First, data are moved between storage tiers 
automatically as dictated by the storage system for optimized performance.  
Second, the entire volume or LUN is not necessarily moved.  Individual blocks or 
predefined chunks of data are moved between storage tiers.  The storage system 
maintains a bitmap record of the physical location of all the data for each LUN 
(Hernandez, 2011).  The movement of data is done transparently to the host 
server.  The unit size of data moving between the different storage tiers is specific 
to a vendor’s own implementation.  NetApp’s implementation allows for the 
movement of data as small as a 4k block between storage tiers (Feresten, 
Freeman, & Woods, 2011).  EMC moves data between different storage tiers in 
1GB chunks (Hernandez, 2011).   
Automated storage tiering introduces the variable of dynamic change in the 
physical location of data across a number of storage devices. This eliminates 
having a fixed, defined space on discrete disk drives where all data for a given 
LUN may reside, thus making it impractical, if not impossible, to directly acquire 
individual forensic disk images to reconstruct a logical disk volume.  As a result 
of this limitation, it is then necessary for the forensic examiner to rely on the 
acquisition of a logical disk image from the server’s view of the LUN or logical 
disk volume. 
3.3 Data deduplication 
Data deduplication is another storage technology that presents additional 
challenges to the traditional forensic disk image acquisition process.  Data 
deduplication is a storage compression tool used to reduce storage capacity 
requirements, and it is used in both inline storage (i.e., online, secondary storage) 
and backup storage functions.  Data deduplication in disk storage refers to the use 
of an algorithm that searches for duplicate data, and then removes the duplicates.  
Duplicate data is replaced with reference pointers to a single copy of identical 
data (Freeman & NetApp, 2009).  Data deduplication is generally done at a block 
or file level and involves processing the data with a hash algorithm such as SHA-
1 or MD5 to generate an index value for each block or file (Bigelow & Hawkins, 
2008).  When new data are being written, the index value created is compared to a 
maintained bitmap or index table for existing data to determine if the new data 
already exists. New data is written to the logical storage device, while duplicate 
data is simply accounted for in the bitmap or index table without writing another 
instance of the data to the logical storage device (Hernandez, 2011). In addition to 
the inline technique of data deduplication described above, these algorithms can 
work a post-process.  When data deduplication is configured as a post-process, 
data are written to the target LUN without regard to duplication, and a scheduled 
process periodically evaluates all newly written data, removing duplicates to 
reclaim the space while placing the appropriate pointers to the retained single 
copy. 
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It does not seem feasible to acquire a forensic image from disk drive where data 
deduplication is utilized, as it is unrealistic to expect a forensic examiner to 
reconstruct data from this image. Reconstructing the data from the image would 
require, at a minimum, a complete understanding of the applicable vendor’s 
specific deduplication implementation. An additional obstacle is the bitmap index 
table used to identify deduplicated files or blocks may not reside on the same disk 
drives associated with the LUN.  This bitmap index is necessary to identify or 
reconstruct all of the missing pieces of data.  Based on the unlikely probability of 
successfully analyzing data from a physical image of a deduplicated disk, once 
again, we recommend forensic examiners obtain an image of logical volumes for 
deduplicated disks.   
Since data deduplication is based on the use of hashing algorithms to identify 
duplicate data, there is also the theoretical possibility of hash collisions resulting 
in the incorrect deduplication.  The non-duplicate data potentially could be lost 
and replaced by the misidentified duplicate.  Storage vendors should have 
sufficiently mitigated this risk, but it is important for a forensic examiner to be 
aware of this potential, at least to defend the validity of any forensic evidence 
obtained from a LUN where deduplication is in use.  The forensic examiner 
should also be aware of the level (block or file) at which any deduplication is 
being performed. 
3.4 Thin provisioning  
Thin provisioning is a storage technology used to optimize the efficiency of 
storage capacity usage in enterprise storage systems. Floyer states, “With thin 
provisioning, a storage administrator allocates logical storage to an application as 
usual, but the system releases physical capacity only when it is required. When 
utilization of that storage approaches a predetermined threshold (e.g. 90%), the 
array automatically provides capacity from a virtual storage pool which expands a 
volume without involving the storage administrator” (Floyer, 2009).   Thin 
provisioning initially allocates only a portion of the physical space for a LUN. 
The storage system maintains a map of allocated physical storage which may be 
stored in the storage system’s cache memory or private disk (Hernandez, 2011).  
Without access to this mapping facility of physical storage, the correct physical 
storage devices cannot be identified; therefore, forensic examiners will find it 
practically impossible to identify all physical storage devices necessary for 
forensic images. Even greater challenges than identifying the appropriate physical 
storage devices for the forensic examiner are the problems of identifying the 
specific allocation blocks or physical sectors associated with the thin provisioned 
volume and the task of reassembling the logical disk volume.   
A technique for obtaining the contents of a thin provisioned logical volume is to 
generate a host-based dump of the thin provisioned logical volume. This host-
based dump would read all of the data from the target logical volume allocated to 
physical storage devices and output a bit-stream copy of this data to a designated 
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image file.  This is necessary, as the host servers are unaware that only a portion 
of the logical volumes’ space resides on physical storage.  This is accomplished 
by the storage system providing the host server with null characters (i.e., binary 
0s) for the remaining non-provisioned space of the LUN. This technique 
effectively spoofs the host’s view of the LUN for the unallocated space 
(Hernandez, 2011).  Often, the server’s view of its storage and the storage 
system’s view of the storage associated with a given server are quite different. 
Some storage systems provide the capability to add additional disk drives and 
then rebalance allocated space of existing LUNS across the added devices.  This 
is can help spread the IO workload across the entire group of disk drives.  This is 
particularly important when the data are striped across a group of drives.  This 
results in shuffling data across the physical drives providing storage for a LUN, 
creating another circumstance in which significant data are being moved across 
storage devices by the storage system without any host awareness. 
Some implementations of thin provisioning include a facility for reclaiming 
unused space. This space reclamation provides another challenge for forensics 
examiners by removing unallocated clusters. Jooss explains, “Space Reclamation 
is the process of allowing the storage system to free the blocks no longer used by 
the host operating system” (Jooss, 2008).   The space reclamation process may 
vary across vendor implementations, for example, some vendors support host-
based processes to identify unused space and communicate using T10 industry-
standard, SCSI commands including UNMAP and WRITE_SAME unmap. This 
allows the host operating system to communicate unused logical blocks that can 
be reclaimed (EMC Corporation, 2011).  For NTFS file systems, the SDELETE 
utility can be used with the “–c” option to overwrite space occupied by deleted 
files with zeros.   A process on the storage system will then release space 
identified by the host process as unallocated, as well as, any other space 
containing all null characters, indicating unused space (Hernandez, 2011).  For the 
forensic examiner, the completion of this process is likely to further limit the 
potential to obtain evidence from unallocated clusters.  
In review, we find that the current best practice for acquiring a forensically sound 
image of a thin provisioned volume is to acquire a logical image of the LUN.  The 
forensic examiner should understand that space reclamation has the potential to 
also remove traces of prior deleted data as well.  At the present time, space 
reclamation is still a fairly new technology and is not as widely available as the 
other storage technologies discussed here; therefore, while this reduces the 
probability that forensic examiners will encounter this technology in the field at 
this time, it also increases the probability the specific forensic examiner that 
encounters thin provisioning at this time will be unaware of the technology and its 
challenges. As with many emerging technologies, we anticipate that thin 
provisioning will become more widely implemented in the future, thus raising the 
probability of this being a more significant concern for forensic examiners. 
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4. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Moore’s Law is frequently cited to document the rapid growth of performance 
and capacity within the field of computational and digital devices, as “Dr. Gordon 
Moore, then a researcher at Intel, hypothesized that computer processing 
performance would double every eighteen months” (Valacich & Schneider, 
2010). Given this rapid growth rate, combined with the reduction in costs 
associated with storage technology, it is understandable that we are experiencing 
increasing levels of complexity and capacity in contemporary, enterprise-wide, 
information storage and retrieval systems. There is a direct relationship between 
the combined complexity and capacity of these storage technologies and the 
challenges forensic examiners encounter regarding obtaining useable forensic 
images of the data contained within these technologies. We have evaluated four, 
non-mutually exclusive, enterprise storage technologies, and reached an opinion 
regarding the current best practice for acquiring forensic images of data contained 
within these technologies. 
Each of the enterprise storage technologies presented above pose added 
challenges to traditional forensic data acquisition methodology.  Digital forensics 
researchers and practitioners should be aware that it is also possible for many of 
these storage technologies be used in conjunction, further adding to these 
challenges.  As a matter of practicality, we find that the best practice for forensic 
examiners to utilize when tasked to obtain a forensic image of data stored within 
configurations based on these enterprise storage technologies is to rely on a 
logical acquisition by taking a forensically-sound, bit-stream image of the LUNs 
themselves, and not the physical disk drives. As overview of the basis for 
reaching our opinion is presented below: 
The first set of factors supporting this opinion is based on matters of practicality. 
While a static or dead acquisition of the target LUN can be done from the target 
server, or a live acquisition can be performed, either of these is likely to result in 
an unacceptable amount of downtime.  The static acquisition will result in 
extended downtime for the associated server.  This may be deemed unacceptable, 
forcing the use of a live acquisition process.  However, even a live acquisition has 
the potential to impact the overall performance of a server should a full 
acquisition of any disk volumes be necessary.  There is still the I/O burden 
associated with a full drive acquisition, and this should be taken into consideration 
when deciding on the best approach for data acquisition. 
In addition to the amount of time necessary for either a static or live acquisition 
described above, contemporary enterprise computational models are likely to 
consist of multiple servers, either actual physical servers or virtual servers, and 
multiple legal entities may be serviced by these physical or virtual devices. It 
becomes increasingly difficult to define the bounds of legal access to forensic 
storage targets when multiple servers share virtual portions of physical storage 
devices, especially when multiple legal entities are involved. 
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In addition to the practical factors presented above, the four contemporary 
enterprise storage technologies evaluated utilize virtual storage techniques that 
make reconstructing logical volumes from physical devices improbable for 
forensic examiners. 
While much the focus of this article has been to identify potential challenges 
presented by newer enterprise storage technologies, there is also the potential for 
them to provide some assistance to the forensic examiner.  Many enterprise 
storage systems provide the capability to produce a snapshot or clone of a LUN.   
This capability has the potential to provide temporal duplicates of data from 
logical volumes.  An additional advantage of creating a snapshot or clone from 
the storage system is that this process generates a relatively low processing 
burden on the host server.  The snapshot or clone can be done with the server 
online, offline, or even powered off since it is performed by the storage system 
itself.  Also, this technique can be performed at a specific instant for the entire 
LUN, addressing potential concerns about changes to a live file system during the 
time required to take a forensic image of a volume.  The snapshot can be created 
and then presented as a LUN on a different server, thus providing a configuration 
that can then be used by a forensic examiner to create the logical forensic disk 
image without an impact on the original host server. In situations where snapshots 
or clones of LUNs are available, we suggest acquiring the snapshot or clone as an 
alternative instead of acquiring a logical image of the LUN, as this provides the 
best method to obtain a logical, forensically sound, data acquisition. 
However, forensic examiners should realize that the combination of thin 
provisioning and space reclamation introduces a potential for non-recoverable 
deleted data. This should be of concern to forensic examiners, as these 
technologies become more widely implemented.   
5. LIMITATIONS 
Within this study, we have identified and discussed four technologies available in 
contemporary, enterprise storage systems. These four technologies were selected 
from our survey of the currently available offerings and emerging trends within 
the enterprise storage system market. While we did not knowingly omit other 
enterprise storage systems technologies from inclusion within this study, the 
possibly exists that other relevant technologies either currently exist or are 
emerging within this market. The reader should also be aware that, given the rate 
of technological advances, it is likely that additional technologies will enter the 
marketplace in the future. 
There is, however, an entire facet to computing infrastructures, including complex 
and remote storage systems that we did not address in this study, namely cloud 
computing. While we do not directly address cloud within this study, it is helpful 
for the readers to recognize that the enterprise storage facilities described within 
this paper are also applicable to cloud computing. Cloud computing encompasses 
many aspects of computing environments, including applications, servers, storage 
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systems, and network devices. Additionally, cloud computing may be 
implemented for a specific application, for an entire enterprise level, or anywhere 
between those two extremes. We thought that a discussion on cloud computing 
within this paper would distract from the important forensic challenges 
concerning enterprise storage facilities; therefore, the primary author of this study, 
along with a coauthor, have addressed forensic challenges to cloud computing in 
another study, and we would like to refer interested readers to this work, titled, A 
survey of cloud computing challenges from a digital forensics perspective 
(Carlton & Zhou, in press). 
The purpose of this study is to provide computer forensics practitioners and 
researchers with an introductory level of understanding of the technologies 
currently available in enterprise storage systems, and then to identify challenges 
forensic examiners will likely face when tasked with acquiring digital evidence 
from systems using these technologies. 
Our evaluation methods used within this study are based on research of secondary 
data, and much of these data were provided to us directly by technology vendors. 
We did not develop any primary data within this study, nor did we conduct 
experiments using these technologies; therefore, a limitation exists based on the 
extent to which the secondary data provided to us are accurate. Similarly, given 
the for-profit motives of the technology vendors, a limitation exists regarding the 
possibly of exaggerated claims of technical performance without verified, 
independent testing in controlled laboratory conditions. 
Lastly, the information presented within this study is based on our understanding 
of the data from a technical perspective, as well as, our understanding of current 
digital forensics data acquisition and analysis methodologies. We are not 
attorneys; therefore, we are not providing legal advice in our opinions. Rather, our 
opinions are presented to offer guidelines for forensic examiners, thus allowing 
them to consult with attorneys from an informed perspective.  
6. CALL FOR ACTION 
As indicated within the section on limitations, this study was conducted from 
secondary data. A more thorough study utilizing laboratory experiments of data 
stored within the technologies identified within this study would be helpful to the 
digital forensics community. Studies involving experiments with known, in-tact 
data, deleted data, and otherwise concealed data acquired by an array of 
methodologies, such as, static, physical acquisition, live acquisition, and static, 
logical acquisition from both the server’s perspective and from the perspective of 
the LUN would be of particular interest. 
Also, more research would be beneficial pertaining to the exploration of the use of 
snapshot or clone technologies, specifically addressing forensic considerations. 
Areas of particular interest include forensically sound data acquisition guidelines 
of snapshot or clone LUN configurations and forensic data analysis of snapshot or 
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clone LUN configurations, especially techniques for virtual restores or protected 
environment restores. 
An additional topic of research that would enhance the understanding of 
enterprise storage technologies from a digital forensics perspective would be to 
identify markers within the data that would help identify the storage technologies 
in use. For example, as described above in section 3.4 Thin Provisioning, some 
technologies remove unallocated data; therefore, it would be beneficial to a 
forensic examiner to know that this technology is in use within an image he or she 
is analyzing. Identifying these markers, if they exist, within the data that identify 
the storage technology in use will provide a significant contribution to the 
understanding of enterprise storage technologies from a digital forensics 
perspective. 
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